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Do	  change-­‐blindness	  and	  inattentional	  blindness	  give	  rise	  to	  perceptual	  
experiences	  that	  are	  so	  inattentive	  to	  be	  unreportable?	  Ned	  Block	  argues	  that	  they	  do,	  
giving	  a	  powerful	  defense	  that	  has	  driven	  forward	  the	  debate	  about	  this	  central	  question	  
in	  the	  philosophy	  and	  psychology	  of	  perception.1	  If	  Block	  is	  right,	  then	  we	  can	  ask	  
whether	  the	  justificatory	  force	  traditionally	  accorded	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  really	  
belongs	  to	  the	  subclass	  of	  attentive,	  reportable	  perceptual	  experiences.	  Your	  confidence	  
that	  there’s	  a	  hole	  in	  the	  ground,	  or	  a	  door	  in	  the	  fence,	  or	  a	  dog	  in	  your	  way	  often	  
derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  can	  plainly	  see	  these	  things.	  If	  you	  experienced	  these	  facts	  
so	  inattentively	  that	  you	  couldn’t	  report	  them,	  one	  might	  reasonably	  wonder	  whether	  
your	  consciously	  seeing	  them	  still	  gives	  you	  reason	  to	  think	  they	  obtain.	  Does	  the	  reason	  
you	  get	  from	  perceptual	  experience	  depend	  more	  on	  its	  attentiveness	  and	  reportability,	  
or	  more	  on	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  experience	  is	  conscious?	  When	  phenomenal	  character	  
comes	  apart	  from	  both	  attentiveness	  and	  reportability,	  does	  its	  justificatory	  force	  go	  
with	  it?	  These	  are	  ways	  of	  asking	  what	  kinds	  of	  rational	  roles	  highly	  inattentive	  
perceptual	  experiences	  can	  play.	  
	  
Our	  main	  goal	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  tenability	  of	  the	  view	  that	  attention	  is	  optional	  for	  
perceptual	  justification	  –	  so	  much	  so	  that	  even	  largely	  inattentive	  perceptual	  
experiences	  can	  provide	  it.	  This	  view	  is	  worth	  exploring,	  because	  on	  a	  widely	  held	  
picture,	  perceptual	  experiences	  provide	  justification,	  when	  they	  do,	  partly	  in	  virtue	  of	  
their	  phenomenal	  character.	  Whether	  or	  not	  one	  accepts	  the	  traditional	  identification	  of	  
perceptual	  experiences	  per	  se	  as	  a	  provider	  of	  justification,	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  
the	  existence	  of	  inattentive,	  unreportable	  experiences	  counts	  against	  it	  or	  not.	  We	  think	  
it	  doesn’t.	  
	  
After	  some	  preliminary	  clarification	  in	  section	  1,	  sections	  2-­‐3	  formulate	  two	  main	  
theses	  about	  the	  rational	  role	  of	  highly	  inattentive	  perceptual	  experiences,	  and	  sections	  
4-­‐5	  defend	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  inattentive	  experiences	  are	  not	  disqualified	  from	  providing	  
justification.	  We	  conclude	  in	  section	  6	  by	  discussing	  what	  positive	  epistemic	  roles	  
attention	  might	  have.	  Throughout,	  our	  discussion	  of	  experience	  applies	  only	  to	  
perceptual	  experiences.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  Thanks	  to	  Anne	  Aimola	  Davies,	  Ned	  Block,	  Geoff	  Lee,	  Adam	  Pautz,	  Daniel	  Stoljar,	  Scott	  
Sturgeon,	  Vogel,	  Sebastian	  Watzl,	  and	  audiences	  at	  Leeds	  and	  the	  Columbia	  Workshop	  
on	  Perception.	  
1	  Block	  1995,	  2007,	  2008,	  forthcoming.	  
2	  The	  term	  “perceptual	  experience”	  is	  sometimes	  used	  to	  denote	  experiences	  one	  has	  
while	  perceiving	  external	  things.	  But	  in	  our	  usage,	  perceptual	  experiences	  include	  
hallucinations.	  They	  need	  not	  be	  cases	  of	  perceiving	  external	  things.	  	  




We	  can	  think	  of	  attention	  as	  a	  degreed	  notion.	  	  Highly	  inattentive	  experiences	  are	  
either	  completely	  inattentive,	  or	  attentive	  to	  a	  very	  low	  degree.	  In	  addition,	  a	  single	  
experience	  can	  be	  partly	  attentive	  and	  partly	  inattentive,	  for	  instance	  if	  you	  see	  two	  
objects	  but	  attend	  more	  to	  one	  of	  them	  than	  to	  the	  other.	  In	  addition,	  one	  can	  attend	  to	  
an	  object,	  the	  spatial	  region	  it	  occupies,	  or	  its	  properties,	  and	  these	  three	  destinations	  
for	  attention	  are	  dissociable.	  Object-­‐based	  attention	  differs	  from	  feature-­‐based	  
attention,	  and	  both	  differ	  from	  spatially	  directed	  attention.3	  One	  way	  for	  an	  experience	  
to	  become	  more	  attentive	  is	  if	  it	  moves	  from	  being	  object-­‐based	  to	  being	  both	  object-­‐
based	  and	  feature-­‐based.	  For	  instance,	  you	  might	  start	  out	  attending	  to	  a	  house	  in	  the	  
distance,	  and	  then	  attend	  to	  its	  color.	  Such	  an	  experience	  could	  start	  out	  being	  merely	  
object-­‐based,	  but	  end	  up	  being	  both	  object-­‐based	  and	  feature-­‐based.	  	  
	  
In	  our	  usage,	  “inattentive	  experience”	  can	  denote	  an	  inattentive	  part	  of	  an	  
experience	  that	  is	  partly	  attentive	  and	  partly	  inattentive,	  or	  an	  experience	  that	  is	  
inattentive	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  object	  while	  being	  attentive	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  property.	  	  
Another	  thing	  we	  mean	  to	  denote	  by	  “inattentive	  experience”	  is	  that	  such	  experiences	  
(whether	  of	  objects,	  spatial	  regions,	  or	  features)	  is	  highly	  inattentive	  –	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  
involve	  zero	  attention	  to	  the	  object,	  region,	  or	  feature.	  (As	  Block	  (2013)	  notes,	  the	  
existence	  of	  experience	  with	  zero	  attention	  is	  experimentally	  difficult	  to	  establish).	  
	  
Talking	  in	  our	  way	  can	  make	  it	  sound	  as	  if	  when	  you	  see	  a	  scene,	  you	  have	  lots	  of	  
visual	  experiences.	  According	  to	  Tye	  (2003),	  this	  is	  false.	  The	  debates	  engaged	  here	  could	  
be	  re-­‐stated	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  parts	  or	  aspects	  of	  experiences	  provide	  justification,	  but	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  having	  a	  convenient	  way	  to	  denote	  those	  parts	  or	  aspects.	  We	  leave	  
open	  whether	  our	  manner	  of	  speaking	  reveals	  the	  ontological	  structure	  of	  experiences	  or	  
not.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  epistemological	  question	  that	  we	  began	  with,	  we	  focus	  on	  
the	  consequences	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  a	  largely	  inattentive	  experience	  of	  a	  red	  square	  
in	  front	  of	  you	  provides	  reason	  for	  you	  to	  believe	  that	  there’s	  a	  red	  square	  in	  front	  of	  
you.	  For	  convenience,	  we	  say	  an	  experience	  E	  is	  attentive,	  just	  in	  case	  its	  degree	  of	  
attentiveness	  is	  above	  the	  threshold	  (and	  its	  surrounding	  grey	  area)	  of	  being	  highly	  
inattentive.	  And	  from	  now	  on	  we	  use	  “inattentive	  experience”	  to	  denote	  experiences	  
that	  are	  at	  least	  highly	  inattentive.	  We	  sometimes	  leave	  open	  whether	  the	  inattentive	  
pertains	  to	  objects,	  features,	  spatial	  regions,	  or	  just	  some	  of	  these	  things.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Block	  (2013)	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  some	  experiences	  involve	  zero	  attention	  to	  
objects,	  even	  if	  they	  involve	  a	  non-­‐zero	  degree	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  spatial	  region	  that	  the	  
objects	  occupy.	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   Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  whether	  inattentive	  experiences	  can	  justify	  introspective	  
beliefs,	  we	  focus	  on	  beliefs	  about	  ordinary	  external	  things,	  and	  use	  “belief”	  as	  shorthand	  
for	  those.	  We	  start	  with	  two	  big	  assumptions.	  First,	  contra	  Davidson	  and	  Rorty,	  
experiences	  in	  general	  can	  provide	  reasons	  for	  external-­‐world	  beliefs.4	  	  Second,	  some	  
experiences	  are	  highly	  inattentive.	  Given	  the	  controversy	  over	  the	  relationship	  between	  
consciousness	  and	  attention,	  putative	  examples	  of	  highly	  inattentive	  experiences	  are	  
controversial.	  To	  fix	  ideas,	  here	  are	  some	  good	  candidates	  for	  inattentive	  experiences	  in	  
our	  sense.	  You	  might	  suddenly	  notice	  stiffness	  in	  your	  knees,	  or	  the	  sound	  of	  a	  drill	  in	  the	  
background,	  and	  realize	  that	  you	  had	  been	  feeling	  the	  stiffness	  or	  hearing	  the	  drill	  for	  a	  
while	  without	  focusing	  on	  it.5	  While	  rummaging	  through	  the	  fridge,	  distracted	  by	  inner	  
ruminations	  but	  looking	  for	  mustard,	  you	  might	  pass	  the	  mustard	  by	  even	  though	  you	  
were	  looking	  straight	  at	  it.	  Later	  on,	  you	  remember	  seeing	  it.6	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  making	  these	  two	  assumptions,	  we	  join	  many	  epistemologists	  in	  
talking	  as	  if	  the	  contents	  of	  experiences	  can	  be	  believed,	  without	  any	  transformation,	  
often	  using	  the	  same	  ‘that’-­‐clause	  or	  propositional	  variable	  to	  denote	  both	  the	  content	  
of	  an	  experience	  and	  a	  belief	  formed	  on	  its	  basis.	  For	  formulating	  the	  theses	  that	  interest	  
us,	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  experiences	  can	  be	  believed	  is	  dispensable.	  Even	  
if	  the	  assumption	  is	  false,	  there	  will	  be	  contents	  of	  belief	  that	  are	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  
the	  contents	  of	  experience	  than	  others.	  Given	  an	  experience	  of	  seeing	  something	  red	  
that	  looks	  red,	  a	  belief	  attributing	  redness	  to	  the	  thing	  will	  be	  closer	  in	  its	  content	  to	  the	  
experience	  than	  a	  belief	  attributing	  the	  property	  of	  being	  an	  elephant.	  Dispensing	  with	  
the	  assumption	  would	  needlessly	  complicate	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  theses	  of	  interest	  
here.	  We	  would	  have	  to	  say	  things	  like:	  “E	  justifies	  P,	  where	  P	  is	  included	  in	  E’s	  content,	  




2.	  Two	  theses	  
	   We	  can	  distinguish	  between	  two	  theses	  about	  the	  rational	  role	  of	  largely	  
inattentive	  experiences	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  first-­‐order	  beliefs.	  The	  Attention-­‐Needed	  thesis	  denies	  
that	  such	  experiences	  have	  any	  such	  rational	  role,	  whereas	  the	  Attention-­‐Optional	  thesis	  
allows	  that	  they	  do.	  	  
	  
Attention-­‐Needed:	  One	  has	  reason	  from	  an	  experience	  to	  believe	  that	  x	  is	  F	  only	  
if	  one	  attends	  to	  x	  to	  more	  than	  a	  low	  degree.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Davidson	  (1980),	  Rorty	  (199x)	  
5	  Block	  1995	  
6	  Compare	  Martin’s	  cufflink	  example	  from	  1992	  “Perception,	  Concepts	  and	  Memory,”	  
reprinted	  in	  Y.	  Gunther	  (ed.),	  Essays	  in	  Nonconceptual	  Content,	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  
237–250.	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Attention-­‐Optional:	  One	  sometimes	  has	  reason	  from	  an	  experience	  to	  believe	  
that	  x	  is	  F	  even	  if	  one	  either	  does	  not	  attend	  to	  x	  at	  all,	  or	  attends	  to	  x	  only	  to	  a	  
low	  degree.	  	  
	  
Just	  as	  attention	  comes	  in	  degrees,	  arguably	  justification	  does	  too.	  Whatever	  the	  exact	  
relationship	  is	  between	  degrees	  of	  attention	  and	  degrees	  of	  justification,	  they	  are	  not	  
perfectly	  correlated.	  Sometimes	  justification	  maxes	  out	  before	  attention	  does	  (staring	  
more	  intently	  at	  the	  mustard	  would	  not	  necessarily	  increase	  justification),	  and	  
sometimes	  attention	  maxes	  out	  while	  the	  experience	  is	  defeated.	  For	  instance,	  if	  you	  
experience	  watery	  surface	  ahead,	  but	  know	  that	  you’re	  in	  a	  desert	  where	  water	  is	  
unlikely	  to	  be,	  then	  your	  experience	  is	  defeated	  by	  your	  knowledge.	  It	  could	  be	  so	  
defeated,	  even	  if	  you	  were	  attending	  closely	  to	  what	  looks	  to	  you	  to	  be	  water	  ahead.	  
A	  natural	  view	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  two	  degreed	  notions	  is	  that	  
paying	  closer	  attention	  often	  increases	  justification,	  and	  paying	  less	  attention	  often	  
decreases	  it.	  The	  Attention	  Optional	  view	  (AO)	  can	  grant	  this	  much.7	  The	  question	  is	  
whether	  at	  the	  limit,	  where	  attention	  runs	  out	  but	  consciousness	  persists,	  the	  
(completely)	  inattentive	  experience	  still	  provides	  justification.	  AO	  says	  that	  a	  mustard-­‐
experience	  can	  provide	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  the	  fridge	  contains	  mustard,	  even	  
if	  you	  pay	  next	  to	  no	  attention	  to	  the	  mustard.	  Attention	  Necessary	  (AN)	  says	  it	  can’t.	  	  
Given	  the	  (substantial)	  assumption	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  experience	  is	  part	  
of	  what	  makes	  experiences	  provide	  justification,	  when	  they	  do,	  is	  that	  rational	  role	  tied	  
to	  attention?	  Does	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  inattentive	  experiences	  provide	  
justification,	  or	  doesn’t	  it?	  
	  
Propositional	  vs.	  Doxastic,	  Optional	  vs.	  Necessary	  
The	  Attention-­‐Needed	  and	  Attention-­‐Optional	  views	  could	  be	  formulated	  in	  
terms	  of	  either	  propositional	  justification	  (PJ)	  or	  doxastic	  justification	  (DJ).	  A	  belief	  is	  
doxastically	  justified	  (or	  equivalently,	  well-­‐founded)	  iff	  it	  is	  formed	  and	  maintained	  
epistemically	  well.	  In	  contrast,	  an	  experience	  provides	  propositional	  justification	  for	  P,	  if	  
it	  provides	  some	  reason	  (or	  equivalently,	  evidence	  or	  justification)	  for	  P	  –	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  subject	  goes	  on	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  that	  P.	  To	  apply	  the	  notion	  of	  doxastic	  justification,	  
you	  start	  with	  a	  belief,	  and	  look	  at	  how	  it	  was	  formed	  (and	  maintained).8	  The	  notion	  of	  
propositional	  justification	  is	  applied	  differently:	  you	  start	  with	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  
rational	  support,	  such	  as	  an	  experience,	  and	  ask	  what	  propositions	  if	  any	  it	  provides	  
rational	  support	  for,	  and	  what	  factors	  it	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  to	  provide	  such	  support.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Further	  issues	  are	  whether	  increasing	  attention	  always	  changes	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
experience,	  and	  whether	  it	  always	  changes	  its	  phenomenology.	  Another	  complication:	  	  
paying	  closer	  attention	  to	  what	  you’re	  looking	  at	  could	  give	  you	  more	  justification	  for	  
believing	  proposition	  P	  while	  giving	  you	  less	  for	  believing	  proposition	  Q.	  
8	  Since	  we’re	  mainly	  interested	  in	  which	  beliefs	  would	  be	  rational	  to	  form	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
inattentive,	  we	  focus	  mainly	  on	  norms	  governing	  initial	  belief	  formation	  rather	  than	  
maintenance.	  	  	  
	   5	  
For	  an	  experience	  to	  be	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief,	  must	  it	  be	  attentive?	  
Attention	  Necessary	  about	  doxastic	  justification	  says	  yes,	  Attention	  Optional	  about	  
doxastic	  justification	  says	  no.	  For	  an	  experience	  with	  content	  P	  to	  provide	  justification	  
for	  P,	  must	  it	  be	  attentive?	  Attention	  Necessary	  about	  propositional	  justification	  says	  
yes,	  Attention	  Optional	  about	  propositional	  justification	  says	  no.	  
Against	  the	  background	  of	  our	  assumption	  that	  experiences	  provide	  justification,	  
Attention	  Necessary	  and	  Attention	  Optional	  are	  duals	  when	  they’re	  both	  attached	  to	  the	  
same	  notion	  of	  justification,	  propositional	  or	  doxastic.	  But	  otherwise	  they	  can	  be	  mixed	  
and	  matched.	  For	  instance,	  in	  principle,	  attention	  might	  be	  needed	  for	  experiences	  to	  be	  
a	  basis	  for	  well-­‐founded	  belief,	  while	  not	  being	  needed	  to	  provide	  propositional	  
justification.	  The	  flipside	  of	  this	  observation	  is	  that	  one	  might	  try	  to	  argue	  for	  either	  
thesis	  (AO	  or	  AN)	  about	  propositional	  justification,	  by	  taking	  as	  premises	  one	  of	  the	  
corresponding	  theses	  about	  doxastic	  justification	  (or	  the	  reverse),	  along	  with	  a	  principle	  
about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  notions	  of	  justification.	  We	  consider	  such	  an	  
argument	  later.	  	  	  
Note	  that	  Attention	  Necessary	  and	  Attention	  Optional	  concern	  conscious	  
experience,	  not	  unconscious	  perception.	  They	  aren’t	  theses	  about	  whether	  inattentive	  
but	  unconscious	  perception	  can	  or	  can’t	  contribute	  to	  doxastic	  justification.	  But	  here	  too,	  
one	  might	  try	  to	  leverage	  considerations	  about	  the	  rational	  role	  of	  unconscious	  
perception	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  into	  support	  for	  one	  of	  the	  AN	  or	  AO	  theses.	  We	  use	  a	  
strategy	  like	  this	  later	  to	  support	  both	  of	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  theses.	  
	  
	  
3.	  Motivating	  Attention	  Optional	  
	  
A	  first	  motivation	  for	  both	  versions	  of	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  view	  is	  drawn	  from	  
visual	  crowding,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  Block	  has	  discussed.	  Consider	  the	  experiences	  you	  
have	  when	  you	  fixate	  on	  the	  crosses	  in	  figure	  1.9	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Whitney,	  D.	  and	  Levi,	  D.(2011)Visual	  crowding:	  a	  fundamental	  limit	  on	  conscious	  
perception	  and	  object	  recognition.	  Trends	  in	  Cognitive	  Sciences	  15,	  160-­‐168	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In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  bottom	  middle	  A,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  consciously	  see	  it	  even	  when	  
we	  fixate	  the	  cross	  in	  the	  same	  line.	  	  After	  all,	  (i)	  our	  experience	  differentiates	  what	  is	  in	  
that	  region	  from	  its	  surroundings,	  and	  (ii)	  we	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  what	  is	  there	  as	  an	  A.	  	  In	  
favor	  of	  this	  claim,	  consider	  the	  vivid	  contrast	  the	  case	  of	  the	  upper	  middle	  A,	  which	  we	  
are	  unable	  to	  identify	  while	  fixating	  on	  the	  cross.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  conditions	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  
are	  sufficient	  for	  our	  consciously	  seeing	  the	  bottom	  middle	  A,	  they	  are	  marks	  in	  favor	  of	  
our	  seeing	  the	  bottom	  middle	  A.	  	  Further,	  given	  that	  we	  consciously	  see	  the	  A	  and	  are	  
able	  to	  identify	  it	  as	  such,	  the	  case	  is	  plausibly	  one	  in	  which	  we	  are	  justified	  by	  our	  
experience	  in	  believing	  that	  it	  is	  an	  A.	  	  	  
However,	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  bottom	  middle	  A	  while	  attending	  to	  
the	  cross.	  	  While	  maintaining	  fixation	  on	  the	  cross,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  make	  our	  attention	  
step	  from	  each	  letter	  to	  the	  next.	  	  Compare	  the	  difficulty	  in	  doing	  so	  with	  this	  figure	  from	  




	   The	  example	  of	  the	  bottom	  middle	  A	  is	  thus	  one	  in	  which	  our	  experience	  gives	  us	  
reason	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  an	  A,	  even	  though	  we	  do	  not	  attend	  to	  it.	  	  The	  example	  is	  a	  
counterexample	  to	  Attention	  Needed.	  	  	  
In	  response,	  one	  might	  protest	  that	  you	  identify	  the	  middle	  A	  in	  the	  bottom	  row	  
not	  just	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  inattentive	  experience,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  that	  inattentive	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experience	  plus	  your	  memory	  of	  the	  A	  that’s	  the	  residue	  of	  a	  previous	  attentive	  
experience	  of	  the	  A.	  	  If	  this	  response	  were	  on	  the	  right	  track,	  we	  should	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
identify	  the	  middle	  A	  in	  the	  upper	  row	  as	  well,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  memory	  of	  (an	  
attentive	  experience)	  of	  that	  A.	  	  But	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  do	  any	  such	  thing.	  	  So	  the	  
objection	  fails.	  
	   In	  response,	  one	  might	  deny	  that	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  believe	  so	  strong	  a	  claim	  as	  
[that	  is	  an	  A].	  	  However,	  our	  objection	  to	  Attention	  Needed	  does	  not	  require	  that	  we	  
have	  justification	  from	  our	  experience	  to	  believe	  such	  a	  specific	  claim.	  	  It	  is	  enough	  if	  our	  
experience	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  believe	  a	  weaker	  claim	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  [that	  is	  not	  a	  
hippo]	  or	  [that	  is	  not	  a	  face].	  	  This	  fallback	  position	  still	  supplies	  a	  counterexample	  to	  
Attention	  Needed.	  
	   Alternatively,	  one	  might	  charge	  that	  we	  are	  mistaking	  spatially-­‐based	  justification	  
for	  object-­‐based	  justification.	  What	  experience	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  believe,	  on	  the	  fallback	  
position,	  is	  that	  some	  area	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  display	  containing	  the	  A	  does	  not	  contain	  
a	  face.	  But	  if	  we	  can	  attend	  to	  this	  spatial	  area,	  there	  is	  no	  disconnect	  between	  attention	  
and	  justification.	  
A	  key	  question	  is	  thus	  whether	  you	  can	  or	  can’t	  have	  justification	  for	  attributing	  a	  
property	  to	  the	  A,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  area	  containing	  the	  A,	  without	  object-­‐based	  
attention	  to	  the	  A.	  In	  favor	  of	  the	  position	  that	  you	  can,	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  visually	  
differentiate	  the	  figure	  from	  its	  surroundings.	  The	  figure	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  blur	  –	  it	  has	  
distinct	  elements	  that	  we	  can	  spatially	  distinguish	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  that	  (unlike	  
cases	  of	  camouflage)	  have	  visibly	  salient	  boundaries.	  	  Once	  we	  get	  that	  far,	  we	  seem	  to	  
have	  a	  case	  of	  attributing	  the	  feature	  to	  the	  A	  itself.	  
A	  different	  response	  to	  the	  example	  charges	  that	  we	  don’t	  consciously	  see	  the	  A	  
on	  the	  right	  side,	  but	  allows	  that	  we	  unconsciously	  see	  it.	  Although	  this	  position	  seems	  to	  
sell	  the	  experience	  short,	  we	  can	  still	  indirectly	  reach	  our	  main	  point	  if	  it	  were	  correct.	  
Even	  if	  we	  only	  unconsciously	  see	  the	  A,	  it	  still	  seems	  plain	  that	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  think	  
it	  is	  not	  a	  face.	  If	  unconscious	  perception	  without	  attention	  of	  the	  A	  can	  provide	  
justification	  for	  this	  belief,	  then	  that	  suggests	  that	  inattentive	  experiences	  can	  provide	  
justification	  too.	  	  
	  A	  second	  motivation	  for	  Attention	  Optional	  comes	  from	  comparing	  inattentive	  
experiences	  to	  a	  common	  type	  of	  inferential	  blindness	  involving	  beliefs.	  	  Suppose	  you	  
have	  justified	  beliefs	  that:	  	  
	  
you	  have	  an	  appointment	  with	  X	  alone	  at	  noon,	  	  
you	  have	  an	  appointment	  with	  Y	  alone	  at	  noon,	  	  
X	  ≠	  Y,	  
	  
…but	  you	  haven’t	  noticed	  the	  conflict.	  When	  you	  don’t	  notice	  the	  conflict,	  you	  don’t	  
thereby	  lack	  evidence	  to	  believe	  it’s	  there.	  	  You	  still	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  you	  
have	  conflicting	  appointments,	  despite	  not	  having	  noticed	  the	  conflict.	  Once	  you	  notice	  
it,	  you’ll	  have	  based	  your	  belief	  on	  the	  previously	  un-­‐noticed	  evidence.	  	  
The	  conflicting	  appointments	  case	  illustrates	  a	  general	  point.	  Your	  memory	  can	  
harbor	  evidence	  that	  you’re	  not	  disposed	  to	  use	  in	  forming	  or	  adjusting	  your	  beliefs.	  If	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you	  can	  harbor	  evidence	  with	  this	  feature	  by	  having	  beliefs,	  then	  barring	  a	  great	  
disanalogy	  between	  belief	  and	  experience,	  you	  can	  likewise	  harbor	  evidence	  with	  this	  
feature	  by	  having	  experiences.	  High	  levels	  of	  attentiveness	  in	  an	  experience	  may	  make	  it	  
more	  easily	  used	  in	  forming	  or	  adjusting	  corresponding	  beliefs,	  whereas	  low	  levels	  of	  
attentiveness	  may	  make	  these	  experiences	  less	  easy	  to	  use	  in	  this	  way	  (at	  a	  minimum,	  
one	  usually	  has	  to	  shift	  one’s	  attention	  first).	  
An	  opponent	  might	  challenge	  our	  reasoning	  from	  conflicting	  appointments,	  by	  
disputing	  the	  analogy	  between	  belief	  and	  experience.	  In	  inferential	  blindness,	  when	  the	  
subject	  simply	  fails	  to	  make	  an	  inference,	  no	  further	  cognitive	  processing	  besides	  
inference	  is	  needed	  for	  her	  to	  use	  the	  justification	  that	  she	  has.	  According	  to	  the	  
opponent,	  inattentive	  experiences	  are	  different,	  in	  that	  further	  processing	  is	  needed	  in	  
order	  to	  use	  the	  inattentive	  experience	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief.	  If	  attention	  is	  
part	  of	  what’s	  needed	  for	  further	  processing,	  the	  objector	  says,	  then	  it	  is	  a	  constitutive	  
part	  justification	  for	  experience.	  
In	  reply,	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  shift	  of	  attention	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  use	  an	  
inattentive	  experience	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  well-­‐founded	  belief,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  the	  
attention	  involved	  is	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  justification	  provided	  by	  experience.	  It	  could	  
be	  merely	  an	  enabling	  condition	  under	  which	  experience	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis.	  More	  
strongly,	  the	  case	  of	  visual	  crowding	  suggests	  that	  attention	  is	  not	  in	  general	  a	  
constitutive	  condition	  for	  experience	  to	  provide	  justification.	  So	  there	  is	  no	  general	  
reason	  to	  think	  that	  when	  shifts	  of	  attention	  are	  needed	  for	  experience	  to	  provide	  
justification,	  the	  role	  of	  attention	  is	  always	  constitutive.	  	  
A	  third	  motivation	  applies	  to	  both	  the	  propositional	  and	  doxastic	  justification	  
version	  of	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  view.	  Many	  candidates	  for	  inattentive	  experiences	  are	  
also	  candidates	  for	  unconscious	  perception.	  For	  instance,	  people	  with	  visual	  hemi-­‐
neglect	  don’t	  fully	  process	  information	  on	  one	  side	  of	  what	  they	  see.	  When	  shown	  
houses	  arranged	  vertically,	  where	  the	  houses	  are	  the	  same	  except	  the	  neglected	  side	  of	  
one	  of	  them	  is	  on	  fire,	  neglect	  patients	  say	  that	  the	  houses	  look	  the	  same.	  But	  some	  
neglect	  patients	  also	  seem	  to	  take	  in	  information	  about	  the	  neglected	  (i.e.,	  the	  
unreported)	  stimuli,	  and	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  it.	  For	  instance,	  some	  of	  them,	  when	  
asked	  which	  house	  they	  would	  prefer	  to	  live	  in,	  select	  the	  one	  that	  isn’t	  on	  fire.10	  Their	  
belief	  that	  this	  house	  is	  preferable	  seems	  justified	  by	  the	  information	  they	  take	  in,	  
whether	  the	  intake	  has	  the	  form	  of	  an	  inattentive	  experience	  or	  an	  unconscious	  
perception.	  If	  the	  patient	  was	  averse	  to	  selecting	  the	  burning	  house	  as	  a	  place	  to	  live,	  
that	  choice	  would	  seem	  justified	  as	  well.	  And	  if	  an	  unconscious	  perception	  provides	  a	  
basis	  for	  a	  justified	  belief,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  an	  inattentive	  experience	  could	  do	  the	  
same.	  In	  both	  cases,	  relevant	  information	  is	  taken	  in	  and	  guides	  the	  formation	  of	  belief,	  
and	  in	  neither	  case	  is	  reportability	  needed	  to	  provide	  this	  basis.	  Both	  practical	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Bisiach,	  E.,	  Rusconi,	  M.L.,	  1990.	  Breakdown	  of	  perceptual	  aware-­‐	  
ness	  in	  neglect.	  Cortex	  26,	  643-­‐649,	  and	  Halligan,	  P.W.,	  Manning,	  L.,	  Marshall,	  J.C.,	  1990.	  
Individual	  variation	  in	  line	  bisection:	  a	  study	  of	  four	  patients	  with	  right	  hemi-­‐	  sphere	  
damage	  and	  normal	  controls.	  Neuropsychologia	  28,	  1043-­‐1051.	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epistemic	  rationality	  seem	  to	  cross	  the	  divide	  between	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  
representation.11	  
	   In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper,	  we	  defend	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  view	  further	  in	  two	  
ways.	  First,	  we	  defend	  it	  against	  an	  initial	  challenge	  that	  links	  propositional	  justification	  
to	  usability	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  belief	  or	  doxastically	  justified	  belief	  (section	  4).	  Next,	  we	  defend	  
a	  thesis	  that	  strongly	  suggests	  the	  propositional	  justification	  version	  of	  Attention	  
Optional:	  experiences	  can	  be	  completely	  unreportable	  and	  still	  provide	  propositional	  
justification	  for	  their	  contents	  (section	  5).	  We	  conclude	  by	  discussing	  the	  rational	  roles	  
attention	  might	  play,	  if	  either	  of	  the	  Attention-­‐Optional	  theses	  is	  true	  (section	  6).	  
	  
4.	  First	  challenge	  to	  Attention-­‐Optional:	  propositional	  justification	  has	  to	  be	  usable	  	  
	  
Consider	  the	  type	  of	  inattentive	  experience	  discussed	  in	  connection	  with	  
inattentional	  blindness.	  In	  a	  typical	  inattentional	  blindness	  experiment	  (Most	  et	  al,	  
2001),	  subjects	  fixate	  the	  center	  of	  the	  screen.	  Some	  white	  squares	  and	  black	  circles	  
move	  around	  and	  bounce	  off	  the	  sides.	  Subjects	  count	  the	  times	  the	  white	  squares	  
bounce	  off	  the	  sides.	  A	  red	  cross	  moves	  across	  the	  screen	  for	  5	  seconds,	  right	  through	  
the	  fixation	  point.	  It’s	  visible,	  and	  easily	  seen	  when	  you’re	  not	  busy	  with	  the	  counting	  
task.	  	  But	  28%	  of	  subjects	  do	  not	  report	  it.	  These	  subjects	  might	  even	  deny	  experiencing	  
a	  red	  cross	  -­‐	  just	  as	  in	  the	  conflicting	  appointments	  example,	  you	  might	  deny	  having	  
conflicting	  appointments.	  The	  Attention	  Optional	  view	  about	  propositional	  justification	  
allows	  that	  these	  subjects	  nonetheless	  might	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  a	  red	  cross	  is	  
on	  the	  screen,	  without	  having	  attended	  to	  it.	  
	   An	  objector	  might	  charge	  that	  the	  inattentive	  red-­‐cross	  experience	  doesn’t	  put	  
you	  in	  a	  position	  to	  form	  any	  well-­‐founded	  beliefs	  on	  its	  basis.	  Suppose	  you	  were	  
blindfolded,	  but	  formed	  a	  red-­‐cross	  belief	  about	  what	  was	  on	  the	  screen	  anyway,	  just	  on	  
a	  hunch.	  That	  belief	  would	  be	  ill-­‐founded.	  According	  to	  the	  objector,	  a	  red-­‐cross	  belief	  
formed	  in	  the	  experimental	  set-­‐up	  is	  epistemically	  no	  better.	  	  The	  objection	  then	  exploits	  
the	  plausible	  idea	  that	  doxastic	  justification	  and	  propositional	  justification	  are	  linked	  in	  
the	  following	  way.	  	  If	  the	  subject	  can’t	  form	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  a	  red	  cross	  is	  
present	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  experience,	  she	  arguably	  doesn’t	  have	  propositional	  
justification	  from	  it	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  red	  cross	  is	  present.	  	  
As	  it	  stands,	  the	  objection	  does	  not	  address	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  
form	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  the	  red	  cross	  is	  present,	  by	  attending	  to	  the	  red	  cross.	  	  
On	  this	  picture,	  attention	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  a	  conduit	  by	  which	  we	  can	  exploit	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  We	  assume	  that	  the	  hemi-­‐neglect	  patient	  does	  not	  unconsciously	  attend	  to	  the	  
burning	  house,	  although	  we	  do	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  in	  general	  of	  attentive	  
unconscious	  perception.	  	  For	  evidence	  that	  blindsighted	  subjects	  are	  capable	  of	  
attending	  to	  stimuli	  they	  do	  not	  consciously	  experience,	  see	  Kentridge	  2008.	  	  For	  
evidence	  that	  ordinary	  subjects	  sometimes	  attend	  to	  erotic	  images	  they	  merely	  
unconsciously	  represent	  due	  to	  interference	  with	  one	  of	  their	  eyes,	  see	  Jiang	  2006.	  	  For	  a	  
response,	  see	  Prinz	  2010.	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evidence	  that	  an	  inattentive	  experience	  provides.	  In	  attending	  to	  the	  red	  cross	  and	  then	  
forming	  a	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  there,	  the	  subject	  exploits	  the	  evidence	  that	  was	  there	  all	  along.	  	  
Compare	  Dretske’s	  moustache	  case	  (Dretske	  2007):	  you	  fail	  to	  notice	  that	  your	  friend	  
shaved	  his	  moustache,	  and	  so	  answer	  No	  when	  he	  asks,	  “Do	  I	  look	  different”?.	  If	  you	  
then	  suddenly	  notice	  the	  difference,	  you’re	  not	  suddenly	  gaining	  evidence	  for	  the	  
moustache-­‐proposition	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  Instead	  you	  already	  had	  evidence	  for	  it,	  you	  
just	  hadn’t	  exploited	  it.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  block	  this	  response,	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  inattentive	  experiences	  are	  
destroyed	  by	  shifts	  of	  attention.	  	  On	  this	  approach,	  experiences	  are	  individuated	  by	  what	  
it	  is	  like	  to	  have	  them,	  and	  the	  post-­‐attentive	  experience	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  pre-­‐
attentive	  experience,	  since	  a	  shift	  of	  attention	  makes	  for	  a	  difference	  in	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  
have	  each	  experience	  at	  each	  time.	  This	  approach	  can	  be	  formulated	  as	  an	  argument	  
from	  the	  usability	  of	  justification:	  
	  
Usability	  Argument	  
(Usability):	  An	  experience	  E	  gives	  you	  propositional	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  a	  
is	  F	  only	  if	  you	  can	  form	  a	  doxastically	  justified	  belief	  that	  a	  is	  F	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  E.	  
	  
(DJ-­‐Attention	  Needed):	  If	  at	  t	  you	  form	  a	  doxastically	  justified	  belief	  that	  a	  is	  F	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  an	  experience	  E,	  then	  at	  t	  you	  have	  E	  and	  attend	  to	  a.	  
	  
(Attention	  Destroys	  Experience):	  If	  you	  have	  an	  inattentive	  experience	  E	  of	  a	  at	  t,	  
and	  then	  attend	  to	  a	  at	  t’,	  you	  no	  longer	  have	  E	  at	  t’.	  
	  
Conclusion	  1:	  You	  can’t	  form	  a	  doxastically	  justified	  belief	  that	  a	  is	  F	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  an	  inattentive	  experience	  of	  a.	  
Conclusion	  2:	  No	  inattentive	  experience	  ever	  gives	  you	  propositional	  justification	  
to	  believe	  that	  a	  is	  F.	  
	  
One	  might	  easily	  question	  the	  assumption	  in	  Attention	  Destroys	  Experience	  that	  
no	  experience	  is	  ever	  inattentive	  at	  one	  time	  and	  attentive	  at	  another	  time,	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  ways	  to	  individuate	  experiences.	  But	  instead	  of	  
questioning	  that	  premise,	  we	  question	  the	  other	  two	  premises,	  which	  are	  problematic	  in	  
more	  interesting	  ways.	  
First,	  the	  Usability	  premise	  is	  too	  demanding.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  might	  wreak	  havoc	  
on	  your	  self-­‐conception	  as	  a	  neat-­‐freak	  to	  use	  the	  sight	  of	  mud	  clumps	  on	  the	  rug	  as	  
evidence	  that	  you’ve	  made	  a	  mess.	  	  Even	  though	  you	  accurately	  experience	  the	  dark	  
splotches	  on	  the	  white	  rug,	  you	  might	  be	  unable	  to	  form	  a	  belief	  that	  you’ve	  made	  a	  
mess.	  	  But	  that	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  prevent	  your	  experience	  from	  giving	  you	  evidence	  for	  
that.	  Instead,	  you	  simply	  have	  evidence	  from	  your	  experience	  you	  are	  unable	  to	  use.	  	  	  
Second,	  as	  against	  DJ-­‐Attention	  Needed,	  it	  seems	  doubtful	  that	  the	  experiential	  
bases	  for	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  are	  limited	  to	  attentive	  experiences.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier,	  the	  
hemi-­‐neglect	  patients	  seem	  to	  have	  beliefs	  about	  which	  house	  in	  the	  display	  they	  would	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prefer	  to	  live	  in	  that	  are	  based	  on	  either	  inattentive	  experiences	  or	  unconscious	  
perception	  In	  visual	  crowding,	  experiences	  of	  crowded	  stimuli	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  
corresponding	  well-­‐founded	  beliefs.	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  considerations	  suggest	  that	  inattentive	  experiences	  
provide	  propositional	  justification	  for	  certain	  beliefs,	  whether	  using	  them	  to	  form	  the	  
beliefs	  requires	  a	  shift	  of	  attention	  or	  not.	  	  	  
	  
	  
5.	  Is	  propositional	  justification	  from	  experience	  limited	  to	  low-­‐grade	  reportability?	  
	   We	  have	  been	  focusing	  on	  inattentive	  experiences	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  unreportable	  
by	  the	  subject,	  without	  a	  shift	  of	  attention.	  In	  the	  inattentional	  blindness	  case,	  if	  the	  
subject	  stopped	  counting	  boxes	  and	  continued	  fixating	  the	  dot,	  she	  probably	  would	  have	  
an	  attentive	  red-­‐cross	  experience	  that	  she	  could	  easily	  report.	  In	  our	  earlier	  examples,	  
you	  could	  attend	  to	  the	  drill,	  the	  pain,	  or	  the	  mustard	  -­‐	  you	  just	  don’t.	  But	  if	  you	  did	  
attend	  to	  them,	  then	  not	  only	  could	  you	  form	  standard	  perceptual	  beliefs	  about	  them,	  
you	  could	  also	  (typically)	  report	  both	  those	  beliefs	  and	  your	  experience.	  This	  fact	  gives	  
the	  red-­‐cross,	  drill,	  pain	  and	  mustard-­‐experiences	  low-­‐grade	  reportability.	  Because	  they	  
are	  merely	  potentially	  attentive,	  their	  reportability	  is	  low-­‐grade.	  In	  contrast,	  experiences	  
that	  can	  be	  reported	  (even	  if	  only	  in	  a	  rudimentary	  way)	  without	  having	  to	  shift	  attention	  
are	  reportable	  in	  a	  high-­‐grade	  way.	  
We	  now	  consider	  experiences	  that	  are	  not	  even	  low-­‐grade	  reportable.	  They	  are	  
just	  plain	  unreportable.	  More	  exactly,	  they	  are	  subexperiences	  that	  are	  jointly	  
unreportable.	  These	  experiences	  are	  elicited	  by	  experiments	  in	  Sperling’s	  partial	  report	  
paradigm,	  according	  to	  an	  interpretation	  of	  them	  that	  is	  defended	  by	  Block,	  and	  that	  we	  
take	  on	  board.	  We	  can	  use	  the	  contrast	  between	  low-­‐grade	  reportable	  and	  unreportable	  
to	  probe	  whether	  reportability	  (even	  the	  low-­‐grade	  kind)	  is	  needed	  for	  experiences	  to	  
provide	  justification.	  If	  not,	  then	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  position	  may	  be	  fallout	  from	  a	  
stronger	  thesis.	  If	  reportability	  of	  experience	  per	  se	  is	  optional,	  then	  high-­‐grade	  
reportability	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  typically	  accompanies	  attentive	  experiences	  is	  optional	  too.	  
	  
Sperling	  subjects	  see	  a	  display	  like	  the	  one	  below	  for	  15-­‐500ms.	  
S	  S	  N	  A	  
W	  N	  B	  E	  
V	  G	  A	  N	  
Within	  300ms	  of	  the	  display	  disappearing,	  subjects	  hear	  one	  of	  three	  tones	  selected	  at	  
random	  –	  pitched	  either	  high,	  medium	  or	  low.	  They	  are	  then	  asked	  to	  recall	  the	  letters	  
they	  saw	  in	  the	  row	  indicated	  by	  the	  tone	  (top	  row	  by	  high	  tone,	  etc).	  	  
No	  matter	  which	  row	  is	  cued,	  subjects	  typically	  report	  3-­‐4	  letters	  of	  the	  cued	  row,	  
but	  cannot	  report	  letters	  in	  un-­‐cued	  rows.	  The	  facts	  that	  subjects	  say	  they	  see	  all	  the	  
letters,	  and	  that	  they	  can	  report	  any	  of	  the	  rows	  that	  is	  cued	  suggests	  that	  they	  
experience	  all	  (or	  nearly	  all)	  of	  the	  letters	  in	  the	  display	  (as	  the	  letters	  they	  are).	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Here	  we	  assume	  that	  Block’s	  (2007)	  ‘overflow’	  thesis	  is	  right:	  Sperling	  subjects	  
experience	  all	  the	  letters	  in	  the	  display,	  this	  experience	  morphs	  into	  a	  visual	  phenomenal	  
memory	  of	  all	  12	  letters	  that	  persists	  at	  least	  300ms	  after	  the	  display	  disappears,	  and	  
hence	  its	  capacity	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  capacity	  of	  non-­‐iconic	  working	  memory.12	  To	  avoid	  
distracting	  controversies	  over	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  non-­‐iconic	  working	  memory,	  we’ll	  
just	  call	  it	  a	  halfway-­‐house.	  It’s	  a	  halfway-­‐house	  between	  experiences	  and	  reports.	  	  
In	  the	  Sperling	  experiment,	  the	  twelve	  letters	  are	  not	  jointly	  reportable.	  You	  can	  
only	  remember	  4	  letters	  in	  the	  display.	  You	  may	  attend	  to	  the	  letters	  diffusely,	  but	  
500ms	  isn’t	  long	  enough	  to	  put	  them	  all	  into	  the	  halfway	  house	  that	  sits	  between	  large-­‐
capacity	  phenomenal	  memory	  and	  reports.	  
	  	   Does	  the	  Sperling	  subject’s	  experience	  of	  12	  letters	  provide	  propositional	  
judgments	  for	  a	  12-­‐letter	  belief	  attributing	  those	  exact	  letters	  to	  the	  display?	  (This	  is	  the	  
belief	  that	  display	  contains	  S-­‐S-­‐N-­‐A-­‐W-­‐N-­‐B-­‐E,	  etc.)13	  If	  the	  Sperling	  subjects’	  experience	  
provides	  justification	  for	  this	  12-­‐letter	  belief,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  disconnect	  between	  
propositional	  justification	  and	  reportability.	  We	  will	  defend	  the	  12-­‐letter	  position,	  which	  
says	  that	  you	  have	  propositional	  justification	  for	  the	  12-­‐letter	  belief,	  even	  though	  you	  
can’t	  form	  a	  reportable	  12-­‐letter	  belief	  on	  its	  basis.	  The	  disconnect	  with	  reportability	  
isn’t	  all	  that	  radical,	  since	  for	  any	  row	  in	  the	  display,	  you	  can	  form	  a	  reportable	  4-­‐letter	  
belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Sperling	  experience.14	  But	  it’s	  a	  disconnect	  nonetheless.	  
	   The	  opposing	  position	  says	  that	  the	  propositional	  justification	  provided	  by	  
experience	  is	  limited	  by	  low-­‐grade	  reportability.	  On	  this	  position,	  your	  experience	  
doesn’t	  provide	  propositional	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  S	  S	  N	  A	  –	  
W	  N	  B	  E	  –	  V	  G	  A	  N.	  We	  can	  then	  ask:	  according	  to	  this	  position,	  for	  which	  propositions	  
does	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  display	  provide	  propositional	  justification?	  We	  argue	  that	  if	  
the	  experience	  of	  the	  Sperling	  display	  provides	  any	  justification	  at	  all	  for	  beliefs	  about	  
the	  letters	  contained	  in	  the	  display,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  for	  it	  to	  stop	  short	  of	  providing	  
justification	  for	  the	  (specific)	  12-­‐letter	  belief.	  	  	  	  
To	  defend	  this	  conclusion,	  our	  argumentative	  strategy	  is	  to	  consider	  options	  that	  
deny	  this	  position,	  and	  make	  the	  case	  that	  these	  options	  are	  less	  plausible	  than	  the	  12-­‐
letter	  position.	  
	   A	  first	  option	  is	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  display	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  
propositional	  justification	  at	  all.	  This	  option	  is	  extreme.	  You	  saw	  all	  the	  letters,	  and	  cue	  
or	  no	  cue,	  you	  have	  a	  justified	  perceptual	  belief	  that	  you	  saw	  some	  shapes	  (whether	  or	  
not	  you	  have	  any	  justified	  perceptual	  beliefs	  in	  more	  specific	  claims).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Block	  gives	  extensive	  arguments	  for	  this	  interpretation	  in	  (2007),	  some	  of	  which	  are	  
summarized	  in	  (2011).	  He	  draws	  on	  results	  from	  Victor	  Lamme’s	  group	  (see	  Lamme	  2003	  
for	  a	  summary)	  which	  extends	  the	  partial	  report	  paradigm	  producing	  results	  that	  seem	  to	  
support	  Block’s	  position.	  
13	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  specific	  12-­‐letter	  belief	  at	  issue,	  a	  generic	  12-­‐letter	  belief	  would	  be	  a	  
belief	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  twelve	  letters,	  without	  specifying	  which	  letters	  those	  are.	  
14	  More	  exactly,	  subjects	  in	  general	  can	  report	  3-­‐4	  letters	  from	  each	  cued	  row.	  We	  are	  
rounding	  the	  number	  up.	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   A	  second	  option	  is	  that	  the	  partial	  reportability	  of	  the	  letters	  imposes	  a	  structure	  
on	  the	  justification	  provided	  by	  experience.	  	  For	  any	  4	  letters	  you	  end	  up	  remembering,	  
the	  belief	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  those	  4	  letters	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  experience.	  If	  you	  
ended	  up	  believing	  that	  the	  display	  contained	  the	  5	  letters	  S	  S	  N	  A	  W,	  or	  the	  6	  letters	  S	  S	  
N	  A	  W	  N,	  however,	  then	  on	  this	  option,	  your	  experience	  wouldn’t	  provide	  propositional	  
justification	  for	  this	  belief,	  because	  justification	  runs	  out	  after	  4	  letters.15	  	  
This	  result	  generates	  dependencies	  where	  intuitively	  there	  are	  none.	  Suppose	  
you	  formed	  the	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  S	  S	  N	  A	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
experience.	  Now	  consider	  the	  next	  row	  down,	  W	  N	  B	  E.	  If	  propositional	  justification	  and	  
doxastic	  justification	  ever	  come	  apart,	  then	  whether	  your	  experience	  provides	  
propositional	  justification	  for	  believing	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  W	  N	  B	  E	  is	  insensitive	  to	  
whether	  you	  actually	  form	  any	  belief	  at	  all	  about	  the	  display,	  a	  fortiori	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  
display	  contains	  S	  S	  N	  A.	  The	  option	  we’re	  considering	  makes	  these	  facts	  depend	  on	  one	  
another.	  It	  makes	  the	  status	  of	  W	  N	  B	  E	  as	  rationally	  supported	  by	  experience	  conditional	  
on	  whether	  you	  form	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  S	  S	  N	  A,	  and	  it	  
makes	  the	  status	  of	  your	  S	  S	  N	  A	  belief	  as	  well-­‐founded	  conditional	  on	  whether	  your	  
experience	  provides	  propositional	  justification	  for	  W	  N	  B	  E.	  	  But	  however	  well-­‐founded	  
belief	  and	  propositional	  justification	  might	  be	  connected,	  having	  propositional	  
justification	  from	  your	  experience	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  does	  not	  require	  that	  you	  actually	  
have	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  p.	  
According	  to	  a	  third	  option,	  from	  your	  experience,	  you	  have	  propositional	  
justification	  for	  every	  4-­‐letter	  belief,	  but	  you	  don’t	  thereby	  have	  propositional	  
justification	  for	  all	  of	  the	  rows,	  so	  you	  lack	  propositional	  justification	  for	  the	  12-­‐letter	  
belief.	  Justification	  doesn’t	  run	  out	  at	  4	  letters,	  the	  way	  it	  did	  in	  the	  previous	  option.	  But	  
it	  doesn’t	  yield	  propositional	  justification	  for	  the	  12-­‐letter	  belief	  either.	  Here,	  the	  
propositional	  justification	  you	  get	  from	  your	  experience	  of	  the	  Sperling	  display	  is	  
analogous	  to	  the	  justification	  that	  the	  author	  of	  a	  book	  can	  have	  for	  believing	  the	  many	  
sentences	  in	  the	  book	  that	  they	  have	  authored,	  given	  that	  they	  also	  have	  reason	  to	  think	  
that	  some	  of	  those	  sentences	  are	  false.	  Taken	  individually,	  the	  author	  might	  rationally	  
endorse	  each	  sentence,	  yet	  still	  lack	  any	  reason	  that	  the	  book	  is	  free	  of	  mistakes,	  and	  
therefore	  lacks	  reason	  to	  belief	  the	  conjunction	  of	  all	  its	  sentences.	  	  
In	  reply,	  the	  epistemic	  situation	  of	  the	  Sperling	  subject	  differs	  in	  an	  important	  
way	  from	  the	  author’s	  epistemic	  situation.	  In	  the	  author’s	  case,	  part	  of	  their	  reason	  for	  
thinking	  that	  the	  book	  contains	  a	  mistake	  is	  that	  it	  contains	  many	  sentences.	  If	  the	  book	  
were	  half	  a	  page	  long	  and	  contained	  only	  a	  few	  sentences,	  it	  would	  seem	  more	  plausible	  
to	  hold	  that	  justification	  is	  possessed	  for	  the	  conjunction	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conjuncts.	  In	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  A	  variant	  position	  would	  hold	  that	  for	  some	  quadruple	  of	  letters,	  you	  have	  justification	  
from	  your	  experience	  to	  believe	  they	  are	  there,	  with	  no	  further	  restriction	  of	  which	  
letters	  they	  are.	  	  This	  position	  is	  absurd.	  	  It	  predicts	  that	  even	  if	  you	  remembered	  S	  S	  N	  A,	  
and	  formed	  a	  belief	  that	  they	  were	  there	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  your	  experience,	  you	  might	  
instead	  have	  justification	  only	  to	  believe	  that	  W	  N	  B	  E	  were	  present,	  despite	  your	  failure	  
to	  remember	  them.	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Sperling	  case,	  the	  conjunction	  of	  4-­‐letter	  groupings	  is	  so	  small	  that	  it	  is	  more	  like	  a	  very	  
short	  story	  than	  a	  voluminous	  tome.	  	  	  
By	  elimination,	  we	  think	  the	  Sperling	  subject	  has	  perceptual	  justification	  for	  the	  
12	  letter	  belief.	  
We	  can	  also	  make	  a	  slightly	  different	  case	  for	  our	  conclusion:	  
	  
Sperling	  Result:	  For	  any	  row	  of	  four	  letters,	  you	  could	  have	  formed	  a	  well-­‐
founded	  belief	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  those	  letters.	  
Premise:	  Forming	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  a	  given	  row	  of	  letters	  is	  present	  does	  
not	  alter	  the	  character	  of	  your	  experience.16	  
Premise	  linking	  DJ	  to	  PJ:	  If	  you	  can	  form	  a	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  that	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  your	  experience,	  without	  changing	  the	  character	  of	  your	  experience,	  then	  your	  
experience	  gives	  you	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  
	  
Conclusion	  1:	  For	  any	  row	  of	  four	  letters,	  your	  experience	  gives	  you	  reason	  to	  
believe	  that	  the	  display	  contains	  those	  four	  letters.	  
Conclusion	  2:	  Your	  experience	  gives	  you	  reason	  to	  believe	  the	  12-­‐letter	  
proposition.	  
	  
Stepping	  back,	  if	  unreportable	  experiences	  provide	  propositional	  justification	  for	  
their	  contents,	  then	  that’s	  a	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  low-­‐grade	  reportable	  experiences	  do	  
too.	  This	  conclusion	  would	  provide	  direct	  evidence	  for	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  positions,	  
if	  the	  categories	  of	  low-­‐grade	  reportable	  experiences	  (=those	  that	  can	  be	  reported	  only	  
with	  a	  shift	  of	  attention)	  coincided	  exactly	  with	  inattentive	  experiences.	  As	  it	  stands,	  
these	  categories	  do	  not	  coincide	  exactly.	  Some	  inattentive	  experiences	  might	  remain	  
unreportable,	  even	  with	  a	  shift	  of	  attention,	  and	  others	  might	  already	  be	  reportable,	  
without	  having	  to	  shift	  attention.	  But	  they	  do	  overlap.	  Since	  some	  inattentive	  
experiences	  are	  low-­‐grade	  reportable,	  our	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  low-­‐grade	  reportable	  
experience	  provide	  propositional	  justification	  for	  their	  contents	  indirectly	  supports	  the	  
Attention	  Optional	  view	  about	  propositional	  justification.	  	  
	  	  
	  
6.	  What	  are	  the	  rational	  roles	  of	  attention?	  
	  
If	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  position	  is	  true,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  ask	  how	  attention	  
impacts	  the	  rational	  features	  of	  perceptual	  beliefs	  and	  inquiry.	  In	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  
red	  cross	  case,	  we	  saw	  that	  attention	  could	  exploit	  propositional	  justification	  that	  is	  
already	  there,	  serving	  as	  a	  conduit	  to	  form	  a	  well	  founded	  belief.	  	  In	  this	  scenario	  
attentive	  experiences	  play	  a	  privileged	  role	  in	  inquiry.	  When	  the	  subject	  looks	  at	  a	  
stimulus	  attentively,	  she	  is	  already	  in	  a	  position	  to	  use	  her	  experience	  to	  address	  any	  
questions	  she	  might	  ask	  herself	  (or	  others	  might	  ask	  her)	  about	  what	  color	  the	  object	  is.	  
Her	  attentive	  color	  experience,	  compared	  to	  her	  inattentive	  color	  experience,	  makes	  her	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For	  potential	  dissent	  to	  this	  premise,	  see	  Stazicker	  (2011)	  and	  Philipps	  (2011).	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more	  poised	  to	  contribute	  to	  inquiry	  about	  color.	  	  This	  is	  a	  role	  for	  attention	  that	  need	  
not	  involve	  the	  increase	  of	  propositional	  justification.	  Instead,	  its	  role	  is	  to	  use	  what	  
propositional	  justification	  one	  has.	  	  Further,	  when	  the	  subject	  looks	  at	  the	  stimulus	  
attentively,	  she	  is	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  an	  inattentive	  subject	  whose	  experience	  has	  
the	  same	  color	  content	  to	  notice	  any	  changes	  in	  the	  color	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  Of	  course	  
there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  changes	  in	  color	  will	  be	  noticed	  (as	  the	  change-­‐blindness	  data	  
show).	  But	  if	  you	  want	  to	  notice	  changes	  in	  the	  color	  of	  an	  object,	  a	  good	  strategy	  is	  to	  
pay	  attention	  to	  it.	  These	  plain	  facts	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  you	  could	  have	  
inattentive	  color	  experiences	  that	  justify	  beliefs	  about	  the	  attended	  stimuli.	  
A	  somewhat	  different	  role	  for	  attention	  is	  to	  help	  select	  concepts	  that	  apply	  to	  
what	  you	  see,	  even	  when	  this	  doesn’t	  change	  the	  content	  or	  phenomenology	  of	  your	  
experience.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  someone	  is	  wearing	  a	  shirt	  of	  an	  unusual	  shade	  of	  
green.	  If	  you	  look	  attentively,	  you’re	  better	  placed	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  square	  is	  
chartreuse	  or	  lime	  green.	  Even	  if	  paying	  attention	  sometimes	  slightly	  changes	  the	  fine-­‐
grained	  color	  phenomenology	  or	  content	  of	  your	  experience	  (as	  Carrasco	  2006	  suggests),	  
the	  attention	  may	  help	  select	  which	  coarser	  grained	  concepts	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  properties	  
experienced.	  	  	  
A	  related	  role	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  determinateness	  of	  what	  experiences	  represent,	  
by	  bringing	  further	  information	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  contents,	  and	  replacing	  indeterminate	  
old	  contents.	  The	  epistemology	  of	  such	  cases	  plausibly	  involves	  degrees	  of	  belief,	  rather	  
than	  just	  outright	  belief.	  	  Suppose	  your	  initially	  inattentive	  experience	  does	  not	  deliver	  a	  
precise	  verdict	  about	  whether	  the	  road	  you’re	  on	  is	  flat.	  Here	  we	  take	  it	  that	  your	  
inattentive	  experience	  provided	  you	  with	  justification	  to	  increase	  your	  degree	  of	  belief	  in	  
the	  proposition	  that	  the	  road	  is	  flat,	  compared	  to	  the	  justification	  you	  had	  for	  this	  
proposition	  before	  you	  even	  looked	  at	  the	  road.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  your	  experience	  also	  
gives	  you	  justification	  to	  increase	  your	  degree	  of	  belief	  in	  other	  possibilities	  in	  the	  vicinity	  
–	  that	  the	  road	  is	  slightly	  inclined,	  or	  that	  it	  is	  slightly	  declined.	  	  Now	  suppose	  that	  
shifting	  your	  attention	  to	  the	  road	  brings	  your	  experience	  now	  to	  represent	  that	  the	  road	  
is	  flat.	  By	  ruling	  out	  the	  other	  possibilities,	  the	  attentive	  experience	  provides	  you	  with	  
justification	  for	  an	  even	  greater	  degree	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  road	  is	  flat	  
whether	  or	  not	  you	  end	  up	  with	  enough	  justification	  to	  believe	  outright	  that	  the	  road	  is	  
flat.	  	  The	  Attention	  Optional	  approach	  can	  grant	  that	  attention	  sometimes	  make	  a	  
difference	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  propositional	  justification	  experience	  provides,	  without	  
making	  attention	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  experience	  to	  provide	  propositional	  
justification	  at	  all.	  
All	  that	  said,	  it	  seems	  doubtful	  that	  attention	  always	  increases	  the	  degree	  of	  
propositional	  justification	  one	  has.	  	  Consider	  the	  disjunctive	  proposition	  that	  the	  road	  is	  
either	  flat	  or	  slightly	  inclined	  or	  slightly	  declined.	  	  Compare	  the	  amount	  of	  propositional	  
justification	  one	  has	  for	  it	  before	  and	  after	  attending	  to	  the	  road.	  	  Here	  one	  need	  not	  
gain	  propositional	  justification	  by	  a	  shift	  of	  attention	  for	  the	  disjunctive	  proposition,	  even	  
if	  one	  does	  gain	  propositional	  justification	  for	  the	  specific	  disjunct	  that	  the	  road	  is	  flat.	  	  
Your	  degree	  of	  justification	  for	  the	  disjunction	  might	  remain	  constant,	  even	  though	  your	  
degree	  of	  justification	  for	  one	  disjunct	  has	  gone	  up	  and	  for	  the	  other	  disjuncts	  gone	  
	   16	  
down.	  
A	  further	  question	  is	  whether	  attention	  ever	  increases	  the	  degree	  of	  
propositional	  justification	  one	  has,	  without	  increasing	  the	  determinacy	  of	  experience.	  	  
Consider	  here	  the	  debate	  about	  intentionalist	  views	  of	  perceptual	  phenomenology,	  
according	  to	  which	  experiences	  which	  are	  phenomenally	  different	  must	  also	  be	  
representationally	  different	  (Byrne	  2001).	  	  According	  to	  a	  common	  objection	  to	  
intentionalism,	  shifts	  of	  attention	  can	  sometimes	  make	  for	  a	  phenomenal	  change	  
without	  any	  representational	  change,	  for	  example	  when	  you	  shift	  your	  attention	  
between	  locations	  in	  a	  ganzfeld	  of	  color	  (for	  discussion	  see	  Chalmers	  2004,	  Nickel	  2007,	  
Speaks	  2010).	  	  Or	  for	  a	  shift	  of	  attention	  of	  attention	  without	  an	  increase	  of	  determinacy,	  
attend	  covertly	  to	  the	  side	  while	  fixating	  on	  a	  point	  in	  front	  of	  you.	  	  Here	  it	  could	  be	  that	  
you	  need	  an	  overt	  shift	  of	  attention	  for	  any	  gain	  in	  determinacy.17	  	  If	  there	  are	  indeed	  
such	  phenomenal	  changes	  without	  representational	  changes	  due	  to	  attention,	  or	  at	  least	  
without	  boosts	  of	  determinacy	  due	  to	  attention,	  we	  are	  skeptical	  that	  they	  make	  for	  any	  
difference	  in	  propositional	  justification.	  	  In	  such	  cases	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  your	  
perceptual	  evidence	  remains	  the	  same,	  with	  no	  difference	  in	  how	  much	  propositional	  
justification	  you	  have	  from	  it.	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  if	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  views	  are	  false,	  then	  the	  traditional	  
formulations	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  approach	  to	  perceptual	  justification	  systematically	  
misdescribe	  it.	  It	  wouldn’t	  be	  any	  old	  conscious	  character	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  per	  
se	  that	  contributes	  to	  justification,	  but	  rather	  its	  attentive	  character.	  On	  the	  assumption	  
that	  many	  (or	  even	  most!)	  perceptual	  experiences	  are	  largely	  inattentive,	  the	  
justificatory	  role	  of	  such	  experiences	  would	  vastly	  overestimated.	  	  
On	  our	  view,	  the	  Attention	  Optional	  view	  is	  true,	  and	  experiences	  outside	  of	  
attention	  do	  play	  a	  justificatory	  role.	  	  We	  have	  presented	  a	  variety	  of	  considerations	  in	  
favor	  of	  the	  view.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  inattentive	  experiences	  
suffices	  for	  justification.	  	  For	  all	  Attention	  Optional	  says,	  further	  conditions	  other	  than	  
attention	  must	  be	  in	  place.	  	  Consciousness	  may	  or	  may	  not	  suffice	  for	  justification,	  but	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